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The end of the twentieth century has witnessed a dramatic
transformation in the way humans reproduce. Human fertility still
eludes our complete comprehension and control, but we are able to
manipulate it with ever-progressing precision. The symbiosis
between technological advances and evolving social mores has not
only promoted changes in family structure but, predictably, has also
raised unexpected, and at times nearly unintelligible, legal questions.
Faced with these questions, courts have in some instances reached
preposterous results, demonstrating how ineffective our existing
statutory schema are in treating atraditional procreative
arrangements.'
The changes in our social fabric that have accompanied
reproductive technologies, and have promoted openness about their
use, have also been intrinsic to movements which advocate the rights
of the people born from reproductive technologies. Chief among the
concerns of such movements is the need for persons born from
* J.D. Candidate, Hastings College of the Law, 2000; B.A. Columbia University. I
thank professors D. Kelly Weisberg and Lois Weithorn for their assistance with this Note
and for their instruction in Family Law. As always, I also thank Chunky Swellness, my
muse.
1. See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998). In Buzzanca, five
adults were involved in the creation of a child, Jaycee: John and Luanne, the
commissioning couple, an anonymous sperm provider, an anonymous ovum provider, and
a gestational surrogate. Id at 282. An exceptional, and short-lived, lower court opinion
held that the child, by statute, had no parents. See id.
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reproductive technologies to have information about their medical
histories, and the desire of some of these people to meet those who
provided their genetic material. Likewise, adoptees are currently
making great strides in their efforts to gain access to social and
medical information about their origins. In the adoption context,
courts have granted adoptees only limited rights to this information,
and advocates of adoptees' rights have turned their attention to
legislative action.2
In general, there is little statutory treatment of reproductive
technologies and their attendant issues and conflicts. The Uniform
Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act,3 [hereinafter "the
Act"] promulgated in 1989, attempted to fill this void by treating
some of the ambiguities and potential conflicts arising from the use of
reproductive technologies. Certain aspects of the Act had been
legislatively or judicially established in most states; other aspects had
been rarely visited by courts or law makers, and inconsistently treated
when addressed at all.
Despite the Act's goal addressing the rights "historically
deprived" to persons born from assisted conception,4 it did not
address the issues of what records should be kept about the providers
of genetic material, or when and how persons born from assisted
conception5 should have access to such medical records or to
identifying information about the providers. The use of third-party
gametes 6 in reproduction has progressed with minimal regulation and
a great emphasis upon secrecy. Currently, there is virtually no
statutory treatment of a person's access to identifying or non-
identifying information about their genitors7 when they have been
born from donated gametes8 or embryos,9 and, accordingly, there is
2. In Oregon, for example, voters recently approved a referendum, "Measure 58,"
which would grant adult adoptees access to sealed adoption records and original birth
certificates. This law has been upheld despite an attack by birth mothers claiming
protection under the federal and state constitutions. See Does v. Oregon, 993 P.2d 822
(Or. Ct. App. 1999). See also Sam Howe Verhovek, Debate on Adoptees' Rights Stirs
Oregon, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 2000, at Al. For a summary of the open records movement
in adoption see Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution, 2 U.
PA. J. CONST. LAW 150 (1999).
3. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, 9B U.L.A. 199
(Supp. 2000).
4. Id. Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 199.
5. For an explanation of my terminology choices, see discussion infra Part I.B.
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See infra Part I.B.
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no obligation imposed by law to create or maintain records to serve
that end.10 Thus, the historical deprivation suffered by persons born
using assisted conception is exactly what the Act fails to redress.
Such an omission, this Note argues, serves to define the status of
children of assisted conception in an incomplete way, and, therefore,
causes the Act to fail in its mission of providing status and protecting
the basic needs that had been, and continue to be, denied to children
of assisted conception." This Note will demonstrate the need for
policy and regulation regarding record keeping and offspring
information access, and suggest why and how the Act is an
appropriate vehicle to promote this offspring-oriented approach12 in
regulating the use of third-party gametes in reproduction. If our laws
are to address the status of persons born of assisted conception, they
must reflect concerns particular to them.'3  Record keeping
requirements and regulation of access to the information contained
therein are fundamental components to the status, and thus to the
rights, of the person born from assisted conception.
Part II of this Note describes the objectives and substance of the
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, discussing
the Act's contributions to the landscape of assisted conception laws
and its failure to address record keeping and information access; Part
III discusses the issue of record keeping and secrecy within the field
of donated gametes and embryos and the need for regulation
particular to assisted conception; Part IV argues why, in light of the
Act's policy-oriented mission, the Act is an appropriate vehicle to
address those concerns and how alternative provisions could be
10. As will be discussed in Part III, there are regulations, some statutory and some
self-imposed by the industry, requiring certain tests for disease and genetic disorders to be
performed upon donated genetic material. However, such information is not collected for
the purpose of providing the offspring with a medical history or access to identifying
information about their genitor. Rather, the goals of such information collection are for
the purposes of prevention of disease and birth defects. I do not, in any way, mean to
suggest that the current practices are anything but insufficient.
11. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT Prefatory Note, 9B
U.L.A. 199 (Supp. 2000).
12. The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act [hereinafter, "the
Act"] describes its approach as "child-oriented." Id. Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. at 199.
However, I have used the word "offspring" in the place of "child" whenever possible. See
discussion infra Part I.B.
13. The American Heritage Dictionary provides the following definition of status:
"1. Position relative to that of others ... 3. Law The legal character or condition of a
person or thing." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1757 (3d ed. 1992). Thus, the choice of what subjects to treat in a statute
addressing status, in effect, defines that status.
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incorporated into the Act which would urge states to require record
keeping, yet provide states discretion in their treatment of secrecy
and identity release in the use of donated genetic material.
A. Prefatory Note
The practice of assisted conception and the field of reproductive
technology are rife with bioethical, sociological, and legal issues.'
4
While this Note clearly does not attempt to address them all, its focus
suggests, perhaps, that the issues are more easily separable than they
are.
I have chosen to write about the Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act in large part because I agree with the goals
of its mission: to put the needs and rights of the offspring in the
forefront, and to do so uniformly across state lines.15 It is important,
in the search for protective policies and regulation, not to lose sight of
the importance and value of allowing people-within the bounds of
others' rights-to create the families they desire. Many families
utilizing assisted conception are honest with their children about the
14. For a sampling of articles discussing the myriad topics involved in reproductive
technology, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 295
(1988) (comparing surrogate motherhood to single mothers by choice and mothers who
wish to place their babies up for adoption in the face of the biological fathers' objections,
and evaluating all three as child custody disputes with a goal of viewing "parenthood [as]
based on responsibility and connection"), Katheryn D. Katz, Ghost Mothers: Human Egg
Donation and the Legacy of the Past, 57 ALB. L. REv. 733, 733-34 (1994) (exploring "the
profound meaning of genetic ties to the individual and to our genetic ancestors and
descendants ... [and] the importance of genetic considerations in shaping legal and social
policy on egg donation"), Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Threat
to the Traditional Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 952 (1996) (asserting "assisted
reproductive technologies possess the potential to undermine the traditional paradigm" of
families), Kermit Roosevelt III, The Newest Property: Reproductive Technologies and the
Concept of Parenthood, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 79, 79 (1998) (finding the law to
recognize property rights in reproductive material and evaluating how such a finding
"forces us to re-conceptualize parental rights"), Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic
Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscrambling the Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L.
REV. 265, 267 (1995) (arguing for "pre-conception intentions" to control in disputes
involving the use of donated ova), Jerald V. Hale, Note, From Baby M to Jaycee B.:
Fathers, Mothers, and Children in the Brave New World, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 335, 336
(1998) (noting the "widening gap between medical technology and the legal concepts of
the rights and responsibilities of parents, the rights of children, and the rights of
surrogates"), and Karen T. Rogers, Comment, Embryo Theft: The Misappropriation of
Human Eggs at an Irvine Fertility Clinic Has Raised A Host of New Legal Concerns for
Infertile Couples Using New Reproductive Technologies, 26 SW. U. L. REv. 1133, 1136
(1997) (examining the rights of recipients of embryos improperly donated). See also infra
notes 16, 24, 43, 82 & 114.
15. See generally Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. at 199.
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children's origins and, to the most of their abilities, provide their
children with the information available to know their medical
histories, and the tools necessary to develop their identities.
16
B. Note on Terminology
Among the more difficult problems in writing about assisted
conception is choosing the terminology to employ. "Assisted
conception" as used in this Note refers to the use of donor gametes
(sperm or ova) 17 or embryos (fertilized ova). 18 Using the term
"donor" to describe the provider of the sperm or ova to another for
reproduction is, itself, problematic: it describes someone who is
generally not providing something free of charge, and, as some have
argued, it describes the gamete provider not from the point of view of
the offspring, who would be the "donor's child" had circumstances
been different.19 I have chosen to use the terms donor, provider, and
genitor to describe the person who gives their gametes to another
person for reproduction.20 I believe all of these terms treat aspects of
the arrangement and avoid the notions of "parent" which I believe
should be reserved for the person in that social or legal role. The
term "third-party gametes" (or "third-party genetic material")
describes the gametes or embryo provided by a person or people not
from the offspring's social family unit.
Though "offspring" may seem overly technical or impersonal, I
have chosen to utilize it when it is not too awkward to describe the
person born using third-party gametes. The use of "child" to describe
this person may be accurate for many of the issues treated by the
Act,21 but its use shrouds the fact that the "child" becomes an adult
16. See Elizabeth L. Gibson, Artificial Insemination by Donor: Information,
Communication, and Regulation, 30 J. FAM. L. 1, 4-6 (discussing trends in openness among
families practicing donor insemination).
17. I employ "ovum" (or "ova" plural) to refer to the human egg.
18. This is consistent with the Act's definition, which also encompasses surrogacy.
§ 1(1), 9B U.L.A. at 202. For the purposes of this paper it is the status of children vis-a-vis
their genetic origins that is of concern, I do not attempt to treat the gestational role. For
an evaluation of the gestational role in a surrogacy arrangement, see Johnson v. Calvert,
851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding that intent to parent is determinative of maternity in a
dispute between a gestational surrogate and the commissioning couple who had provided
the embryo, where the Uniform Parentage Act, as adopted in California, defined
motherhood exclusively).
19. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. The Act chooses to use the word
"donor" while recognizing this dilemma. § 1(2) cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 202.
20. Again, I am for the most part not treating the gestational role. See supra note 18
and accompanying text.
21. The Act is concerned with particular issues dependent upon the minority status of
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and, especially with regards to record keeping and information access,
their concerns persist throughout their lives. A similar objection
exists in the adoption context: many adoptees complain that they
remain adopted "children" throughout their lives.22 I do, however,
frequently use the term "child" or "children" in a discussion of the
Act to avoid confusion.
23
Finally, it is important to note the use of the word "assisted" as
applied to conception and insemination. Historically non-coital
insemination has been titled "artificial." I prefer to use the terms
"assisted conception," "assisted insemination," or "donor
insemination" to avoid any stigma or misconception that the word
"artificial" may invoke.24
H. The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
A. Purpose of the Act
Over a decade ago, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform Laws formed a committee of specialists to create a
statutory scheme "to provide order and design that would inure to the
benefit" of the children born from reproductive technology.25 When
the Drafting Committee convened it had been nearly 10 years since
the birth of Louise Brown, the first human born using in vitro
fertilization.26 Donor sperm27 had been used to assist in human
the offspring. See generally 9B U.L.A. at 199. See infra Part IV (questioning whether the
concerns expressed by the Drafting Committee are, in fact, well-founded).
22. See Gibson, supra note 16, at 2 n.4 (discussing that author's decision to utilize the
word "offspring" (citing ARTHUR D. SORSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 122
(1978) (discussing this phenomenon relative to adoption)).
23. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
24. It has also been suggested that the term "alternative insemination" be employed.
See Vickie L. Henry, Note and Comment, A Tale of Three Women: A Survey of the Rights
and Responsibilities of Unmarried Women Who Conceive by Alternative Insemination and
A Model For Legislative Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 285, 285 n.2 (1993) (describing the
author's decision to use the word "alternative" in lieu of "artificial" in reference to donor
insemination).
25. See Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. at 199.
26. See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The "Orwellian Nightmare" Reconsidered: A
Proposed Regulatory Framework for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L.
REV. 625, 628 (1991).
27. Assisted insemination (frequently referred to as "artificial insemination") is either
homologous (using the husband's sperm) or heterologous (using sperm not from the
husband). See, e.g., In Re Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. 1973)
(describing the difference between homologous and heterologous insemination). It is,
therefore, heterologous insemination that utilizes what is referred to as "donor" sperm.
Some scholars have taken issue with the term "donor." They assert that the term is
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conception for over two centuries, 28 but the technology of in vitro
fertilization now allowed for the use of donor ova and embryos as
well.29 Fresh in the Nation's memory was the Baby M case, in which a
surrogate mother reneged on her contract and succeeded at asserting
her parental rights.30 The "traditional" surrogacy31 at issue in the
inappropriate because the "donor" is usually paid for his sperm, and that the title
undervalues the contribution of the sperm "provider," as they would prefer him titled. See
Ken Daniels, The Semen Providers, in DONOR INSEMINATION: INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 76, 76 (Ken Daniels & Erica Haimes eds., 1998). This author is
sympathetic to that argument but would also add that the term "donor" reflects more
upon the relationship between the provider of the sperm and the parents of the offspring;
the term "genitor" or "donor-genitor" lends a more accurate description of the
relationship between the provider of the genetic material and the resulting offspring. As
will be discussed in Part HI, most statutory and contractual treatments of the offspring
from assisted conception lack a recognition of this relationship. See infra Part II. This
author will use the terms "provider," "donor," and "genitor" somewhat interchangeably,
trying to be sensitive to context and the parties being discussed. See discussion supra Part
I.B.
28. The first recorded instance of homologous assisted insemination in humans
occurred in Britain in the 18th century. See Megan D. McIntyre, Comment, The Potential
for Products Liability Actions when Artificial Insemination by an Anonymous Donor
Produces Children with Genetic Defects, 98 DICK. L. REV. 519, 519 n.1 (1994) (citing
DOUGLAS J. CUSINE, NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
12, 13 (1988)). The first homologous insemination in the United States occurred in 1866.
See Denise S. Kaiser, Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving
Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 794 n.6 (citing W. FEINGOLD, ASSISTED
INSEMINATION 6 (1964)). The first successful assisted insemination using donor sperm
occurred in 1884, with sperm provided by a medical student. Neither the woman nor her
husband consented to the procedure or even knew it was going to be attempted. The
husband was later informed as to the origins of his child, but the wife was never told. See
Erica Haimes & Ken Daniels, International Social Science Perspectives on Donor
Insemination: An Introduction, in DONOR INSEMINATION: INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 1, 2 (Ken Daniels & Erica Haimes eds., 1998).
29. In vitro fertilization unites sperm and ovum outside of the human body and the
resulting embryo (or pre-embryo) is then introduced into a woman's uterus. Thus, the
genetic, gestational, and rearing aspects of parenthood are entirely separable. See Eggen,
supra note 26, at 633-34. See generally LORI B. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPTIONS: A
CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE NEWEST INFERTILITY TREATMENTS, INCLUDING IN
VITRO FERTILIZATION, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, AND SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
(1984) (describing various methods of assisted conception).
30. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1263-64 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1988) (reversing the lower
court's ruling terminating the parental rights of the "surrogate" and holding that surrogacy
contracts are contrary to public policy and thus void and unenforceable; remanding for
determinations of custody and visitation).
31. Traditional surrogacy refers to an arrangement in which the surrogate is
inseminated, usually with the intended father's sperm, and performs both the genetic and
gestational functions. In a gestational surrogacy arrangement, itself made possible by in
vitro fertilization, fertilization occurs outside of the surrogate's body and the surrogate
generally does not provide the ovum but performs the gestational function. See
ANDREWS, supra note 29, at 254.
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Baby M case, however, was not a product of the new reproductive
technology but was, rather, a result of a process that was centuries
old,32 and had its roots in practices that can be traced back to biblical
times.33 Despite this, many viewed the Baby M case as resulting from
technology gone awry.34
It was against this backdrop that the Drafting Committee
produced, and the National Conference, adopted the Act.35 The
Drafting Committee recognized the complexity of the issues arising
from assisted conception,36 and the need for detailed regulation, but
saw as its primary responsibility the "status" of children born from
"this new modern miracle. '37 The "beautiful, innocent children" born
using assisted conception, "without traditional heritage, or parentage
and other fundamentals... [had] been deprived of basic rights." 38
The Act's mandate, as stated in its prefatory note, was "to draft
an act, a child oriented act, to provide order and design that would
inure to the benefit of those children who have been born as a result
of [assisted conception]. ' 39 Likening reproductive technology to the
splitting of the atom, the drafters took it upon themselves to "develop
order and design in [reproductive technology's] use and
implementation for the good of humanity. '40
With that weighty agenda in mind, the Drafting Committee more
narrowly stated their mission as "address[ing] ... the precise issue of
the status of children, their rights, security, and well being."' 41 The
"plight" of children of assisted conception, as put forth in the Act,
having "five parents,... no father,... [or] no one responsible for
support, nurturing, health, well being, or rights as a person or a
member of society" was the "greatest priority and first call" of the
32. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., Esther Dyson, New Product of Knock Off?, FORBES, June 15, 1987, at
272 ("Fertilization technology brought us Baby M ...."); Richard N. Ostling, Technology
and the Womb: Rome Denounces Some Rapidly Spreading Methods of Conception, TIME,
March 23, 1987, at 59 (discussing Baby M as an example of "scientific technology").
35. See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION Acr Prefatory Note,
9B U.L.A. 199 (Supp. 2000).
36. "Assisted conception" is defined by the Act to encompass any mode of
reproduction that introduces third party genetic material into the reproductive process.
Id. § 1(1), 9B U.L.A. at 202. See also infra Part II.B (discussing the scope and details of
the Act).
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Drafting Committee.42  They sought to create an act "which
addressed these and other deficiencies." 43
To that end the Drafting Committee created a simple (by their
own admission, too simple) scheme for "stat[ing] clearly essential
principles without inordinate elaboration or detailed regulatory
procedures." 44  Their goal, in so doing, was to "limit [the Act's]
applicability to what is best for children," and to "strengthen the
focus of [the] Act in the eyes of legislators and the public as
prospective legislation which is needed immediately to provide order,
direction, and design with dignity to the unsettled lives of our target
children. 4
5
An exception to the shallow treatment afforded the status issues
in the Act is the issue of surrogacy. Despite the emphatic insistence
that the Act was "not a surrogacy regulatory act, nor was it intended
to be" the National Conference directed the "Drafting Committee, by
almost unanimous vote, to proceed by making use of such limited and
monitored surrogacy procedures as might be necessary to accomplish
its mandate. '46 The Act thus provides an "Alternative A" and an
"Alternative B" for those states wishing to regulate or make void
surrogacy contracts, respectively. 47
B. Scope and Substance of the Act
To promote those "clearly essential principles" the Act provides
42. Id.
43. l It is questionable exactly what the drafters had in mind with such broad
statements of the "plight" of the children of assisted conception. The most notable
cases-surrogacy and donor insemination-involved problems of status, but only because
too many individuals were competing for parental rights to the child. See, e.g., In re Baby
M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1263 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1988) (conferring parental rights upon the surrogate
mother (who was also the biological mother) in the face of the claim by the commissioning
couple, who included the biological father of the child, to exclusive parental rights). See
also Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a recipient of
sperm from a known donor who did not provide semen through a licensed physician was
not entitled to statutory protection against an order of donor paternity); Thomas S. v.
Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994) (order of filiation issued for known donor
when the parties had voluntarily initiated a relationship between the donor and the
offspring). For further discussion of this confounding aspect of the Prefatory Note, see
infra, Part III.C.
44. Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. at 199. The Drafting Committee, at the behest of an
"almost unanimous vote" of the Conference, included basic regulatory provisions in its
treatments of surrogacy arrangements. Id. §§ 5-10 [Alternative A] at 205, § 5 [Alternative
B] at 212, Prefatory Note at 199.
45. Id. Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. at 199.
46. Id.
47. Id. §§ 5-10 [Alternative A] at 205, § 5 [Alternative B] at 212, Prefatory Note at 199.
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12-16 sections, depending upon the attitude taken toward surrogacy.48
"Assisted conception" is defined under the Act to include all non-
coital acts of conception except those that utilize a married couple's
own gametes.49 Thus, it is the use of donated genetic material, not the
technology involved that determines whether the conception is
"assisted." 50
The technology required to utilize the various third party genetic
materials is itself responsible for historically inconsistent treatment
with regards to medical record keeping: little (or no) medical
information is required to successfully collect or utilize donor sperm,
whereas the processes of harvesting ova and implanting embryos
require a great deal of medical information and intervention, and, as
a result, necessarily produce medical records.51  The common
classification of the use of all third party genetic material in the Act's
definition of Assisted Conception is incongruous with the
technological realities of the procedures; this uniform treatment of
donated sperm, ova, and embryos-one of the ways the Act is most
innovative-is undermined by the failure to equalize their procedures
with regards to record keeping.
A "donor" under the Act may provide sperm or ova, but does
not include one who is also the "parent."52 Donors do not, however,
need to be anonymous, nor do they need to provide their gametes
through a licensed physician.53 The failure to require that third-party
genetic material be provided through a physician is a departure from
the laws of many states, and is really of significance only with regards
to the use of donor sperm because of the medical assistance needed to
utilize a donor ova or embryo.54 The involvement of a licensed
physician does not necessarily ensure medical record keeping, but is
most valuable in situations in which the "donor" characterization of
48. 9B U.L.A. at 199. Sections 5-9 are contained in Alternative A, while Alternative B
comprises a single section 5 and thus eliminates 6-9, reducing the overall number of
sections to 12. Id.
49. § 1(1), 9B U.L.A. at 202.
50. See § 1 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 202-03.
51. The retrieval of ova for donation, as well as their fertilization and preservation, are
technical clinical procedures requiring the use of fertility drugs. The parties must undergo
testing and surveillance by trained personnel. The donation and insemination of sperm,
on the other hand, needs little more than a device to insert the sperm into the vagina of
the mother, though more complicated procedures are in place that relate to testing and
storing of the semen.
52. § 1(2), 9B U.L.A. at 202.
53. See § 1(2) and cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 202.
54. An exception to this is traditional surrogacy in which the gestational host is also
the ovum donor.
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the sperm provider is at issue.55
The Act states that, with the exception of a valid surrogacy
arrangement under "Alternative A," the woman who gives birth to a
child is the child's mother;56 the husband of a married woman
undergoing assisted conception is presumed to be the father, unless
he institutes action within two years of the child's birth to rebut the
presumption that his consent was given.5 7 Donors and deceased
individuals are precluded from parenthood status under the Act.58
The Act further differentiates between the "intended parents"
and a "surrogate" in a surrogacy arrangement. It limits the "intended
parents" to a married couple,5 9 but contemplates the surrogacy
arrangement to be either "traditional," in which the surrogate is
inseminated (usually with the intended father's sperm) and thus
contributes the ovum, or "gestational," in which the surrogate is
implanted with an embryo that may be a result of donor gametes,
entirely or in part.60 The surrogacy portions of the Act allow a state
to either endorse or reject surrogacy arrangements. 61 The Act further
55. Disputes have arisen when a known "donor" challenges a parent's assertion that
he agreed not to have a parental relationship with the resulting child. Conversely, similar
disputes have arisen when the "donor" attempts to evade parental duties. See, e.g.,
Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986); Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618
N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994).
56. § 2, 9B U.L.A. at 203.
57. § 3, 9B U.L.A. at 203.
58. § 4, 9B U.L.A. at 204. The Act consciously permits donors to provide sperm on
their own or through a physician. Id § 4 cmt, 9B U.L.A. at 204. Ova, logistically, must be
provided by a physician.
59. § 1(3), 9B U.L.A. at 202. The Act explicitly states its goal to provide the assisted-
conception child with two parents. See supra text accompanying note 44. Presumably, this
limitation on who can contract with a surrogate under the Act is an expression of this
policy judgement. For a criticism of the Act in its preference toward married couples in
surrogacy, see Ann MacLean Massie, Restricting Surrogacy to Married Couples: A
Constitutional Problem? The Married Parent Requirement in the Uniform Status of
Children of Assisted Conception Act, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487 (1991) (evaluating
the Act's surrogacy schema under the Constitution) and Mimi Yoon, The Uniform Status
of Children of Assisted Conception Act: Does it Protect the Best Interests of the Child in a
Surrogate Arrangement, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 525 (1990) (concluding that the Act's
surrogacy provisions do not protect the best interests of the child). It is not clear,
however, if this is an expression of the Drafting Committee's disdain for same-sex couples
using a surrogate, or an implicit understanding that the law, generally, does not lend a
great degree of support for same-sex parenting, namely the rights or access to adoption of
the same-sex "second-parent."
60. § 1(4), 9B U.L.A. at 202. A surrogate is "an adult woman who enters into an
agreement to bear a child conceived through assisted conception for intended parents."
Id. Assisted conception is defined as either assisted insemination or implantation with an
embryo. See id. §1(1), 9B U.L.A. at 202. See also supra note 31.
61. §§ 5-9 [Alternative A], 9B U.L.A. at 205 (regulating surrogacy arrangements and
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applies its exclusive status determinations to succession and
inheritance, paralleling adoption statutes for these purposes.62
C. The Act's Contributions and Failures
1. The Act's Attempts to Improve Existing State Law
Nearly every state provides, statutorily, for the parentage in the
use of donor sperm. Some states require that if the parties wish to
ensure that the donor has no parental rights and duties, the sperm
must be provided through a licensed physician.63 While many of
these statutes existed prior to the Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act, a good number were adopted in the years
surrounding the Act's inception.
Prior to, and since, the promulgation of the Act, individual states
have, for the most part, failed to address the use of ovum and embryo
donation in the context of establishing parentage. 64  The Act,
therefore, in its uniform treatment of sperm and ovum donors, was
progressive. By making the parentage uniform, whether the child was
born using donor sperm, ova, or both, the Act ensures that all
"children are taken care of.' 65
This facet of the Act speaks, wisely, to the uniformity of the
experiences of children of assisted conception: regardless of the
technology used,66 the child has a genetic relationship to a third party,
frequently anonymous.67 The parentage of many children of assisted
conception is thus explicitly clarified by the Uniform Status of
Children of Assisted Conception Act.68 However, as previously
providing for their preapproval and enforceability); § 5 [Alternative B], 9B U.L.A. at 212
(providing that surrogacy arrangements are void if not approved by the court).
62. § 10 and cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 213.
63. The Drafting Committee recognized this jurisdictional variation as it existed at
that time. See § 4 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 204.
64. See, e.g., UNnF. PARENTAGE ACT, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been
Adopted, 9B U.L.A. 17 (Supp. 2000).
65. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION AT Prefatory Note, 9B
U.L.A. 199 (Supp. 1999).
66. See infra text accompanying note 68.
67. See Gibson, supra note 16, at 5.
68. The Act provides for parentage in most situations. However, the provisions of the
surrogacy alternatives require the "intended parents" to be a married couple. See § 1(3),
9B U.L.A. at 202. Therefore, it is unclear what outcome would occur under the Act if, for
example, a gay, male couple were to commission a surrogate using a donated embryo. The
language of the Act suggests that their contract would not receive the judicial preapproval
necessary for a partially enforceable contract. I&. (defining intended parents in a
surrogacy arrangement to be a married couple); Id. § 6 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 207-08
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discussed, the absence of attention to the issue of record keeping
undermines the progress made by the Act with regards to equalizing
the experience of people born using donor sperm, ovum, or embryo.
The Act broadens the category of "donor," not restricting the
title to those who are anonymous, or those who provide their gametes
through a licensed physician.69 While the question of the physician's
role is, for practical purposes, only an issue in the case of donated
sperm,70 the Drafting Committee's decision not to require physician
involvement recognizes the numerous instances in which sperm is
provided without the use of a physician.71 Thus private arrangements
and agreements with known donors are potentially covered by the
Act's determinations of parentage.
2. The Act's Goals Fail to Accurately Assess the Offspring's Interests
The Act's prefatory note reveals both a legitimate concern for
the rights of children of assisted conception,72 and a laudable impulse
to place the interests and rights of the child in the forefront. It also
expresses concerns regarding the "plight" of children of assisted
conception that are, on their face compelling.73  Upon further
reflection and an examination of the conflicts that have arisen from
the use of assisted conception, the concerns expressed by the Act are
of questionable applicability. One has to ask whether the concerns
are well-founded, and whether they serve the offspring-oriented
goals74 of the Act.
For the children, "some with five parents, some with no father" is
it in the their best interest to restrict assisted conception, and the
Act's status protections, to situations in which the child is guaranteed
a father, or to recognize, for example, the child's two mothers? In the
case of a child who has five "parents" (or, as I prefer to think of it,
(detailing the preapproval process for surrogacy arrangements). Another issue is left open
by the Act's definition of donor, which does not require the participation of a licensed
physician in providing the donor gametes or embryos. Id. § 1 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 205.
Using a licensed physician formalizes the process of donation and thus delineates the
distinction between donor and (putative) parent. Thus, while the parentage of a child
born from donor sperm is determined by the Act, when the sperm provider is a "donor" is
not.
69. § 1(2) and cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 202. See also Gibson, supra note 16, at 4-6.
70. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
71. See §4 (a) cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 204.
72. The Drafting Committee describes goals that few could argue are legitimate-the
rights of children of assisted conception to inherit, have property rights, and be deserving
of support. See Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. at 199.
73. See id. See also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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five adults involved in conception, gestation, and parenting) is it in
the child's best interests to have a two-parent status ensured or do we
need to go further than that and recognize the interests of the child
with regards to his or her genetic and gestational reality?75
The Act seems to answer these questions with fear that children
of assisted conception, because they are "without traditional heritage,
or parentage," will not be adequately parented. The Act identifies
one "plight" of children of assisted conception as having "no one
responsible for support, nurturing, health, [or] well being. '76 One has
to wonder to whom the Act is referring. Is it the child who has one or
two parents and a gamete donor also wishing to parent? The child
who has a gestational surrogate claiming parental rights? Certainly
no one would dispute that conflicts between adults over parental
rights to children are deleterious to the child. However, because the
problems generally arise as a result of too many adults wishing to
parent, the child will certainly have at least one (or multiple)
person(s) "responsible for support, nurturing, health, [and] well
being.'77
The Act's resigned and somewhat pejorative attitude toward
assisted conception is apparent. Recognizing that the "genie will
never return to the bottle" the Act portrays infertility as "be-
devil[ing] our society," 78 ignoring that assisted conception is, in some
cases, a voluntarily chosen parenting option, not just an infertility
cure.79 It appears that the "status" the Act attempts to ensure is one
that is more uniform with children not born of assisted conception.
Instead the Act should have dealt specifically with the special status
issues affecting children of assisted conception and promoting their
uniformity across state lines.
80
75. The Drafting Committee predicted a situation that was decided by the California
courts in 1998. See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
76. Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. at 199.
77. In Buzzanca, the appellate court determined that the commissioning couple was
the child's legal parents. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282. Parenthood was thus
established without the protection of the Act.
78. Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. at 199. "Bedevil" is defined: "1. To torment
mercilessly; plague. 2. To worry, annoy, or frustrate. 3. To possess with or as if with a
devil; bewitch. 4. To spoil, ruin." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 164 (3d ed. 1992).
79. Single women or gay or lesbian couples gladly embrace assisted conception as
enabling them to parent, without a need to cure anything.
80. See supra Part I. I do not mean to suggest that the persons born of assisted
conception should not have the same status as those conceived by "natural means" with
regards to support, inheritance, and property rights. The Act, I assert, should have gone
further in recognizing these special status issues as well.
1060 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51
3. The Act Omitted Important Status Considerations
Status issues remain even after parentage is established.8' With
biological and social facets of parenthood separated, the child of
assisted conception has, as a component of his or her status, special
needs for medical information, and some argue identifying
information, from the biological genitor(s) that are not met simply by
giving legal status to the social parents. The Uniform Status of
Children of Assisted Conception Act ignores this unique element
which creates the child's status as that of a child of assisted
conception.
LI.The Need and Demand for Regulation Specific to Donor-
Genitor Record Keeping and Offspring Information Access
There is currently very little regulation of the fertility industry in
the United States. That which does exist is largely self-imposed by
the industry, and is targeted only toward ensuring that donated
gametes and embryos are free from communicable disease and easily
detectable genetic disorders. 82 These regulatory measures and
industry standards protect certain important interests of the offspring,
such as the interest in being free from the HJV virus or the Tay-Sachs
gene.83 Even in the rare cases where donated gametes are specifically
addressed in a statute, the objective frequently remains medical, as
opposed to social. These statutes focus upon the immediate harm to
the parent or offspring, rather than upon the offspring's potential
future harm of not knowing her or his own medical history or
biological background.84
The need for regulatory and policy-based measures that
specifically address the issue of record keeping and offspring access to
records in the use of third party genetic material for assisted
81. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
82. See Eggen, supra note 26, at 667-86 (discussing, more broadly, the regulation of
reproductive technology); Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Adoption, Reproductive
Technologies, and Genetic Information, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 125, 135-36 (describing
existing industry and statutory requirements for the collection of genetic information or
medical histories of donors); Gibson, supra note 16, at 37-38. See generally Stacey A.
Huse, The Need For Regulation in the Fertility Industry, 35 J. FAM. L. 555 (1997)
(describing the existing state, federal, and industry-imposed regulations in the fertility
industry); Ami S. Jaeger, Laws Surrounding Reproductive Technology, in FAMILY
BUILDING THROUGH EGG AND SPERM DONATION: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL
ISSUES 133 (Machelle Seibel & Susan J. Crockin eds., 1996).
83. See Andrews & Elster, supra note 82, at 136; Gibson, supra note 16, at 37-38.
84. See supra notes 82-83.
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conception results from several factors: the casual nature of the use
of donor sperm, and, thus, how the use of third party gametes have
evolved; the inadequacy of adoption statutes and case law to address
the issue; the inadequacy of tort law to impose record keeping duties
upon fertility clinics; and the failure of constitutional law to recognize
an absolute right to open records. In addition, private ordering
between donors and recipients, as well as grass-roots movements for
information access led by adults who were children of assisted
conception, suggest that the recognition of certain uniform rights is
needed.
A. The Development of the Use of Third-Party Genetic Material
When heterologous insemination was first performed upon a
woman centuries ago, it was done with neither her awareness nor her
consent.85 In the ensuing years, the use of donor sperm was a dark
secret for the participating families, and sperm was (and in many
instances still is) collected from medical students, college students,
and even the doctors themselves, with virtually no record keeping. 86
This shame-filled, ad-hoc method of providing women and couples
with sperm led to an industry largely unregulated, scientifically,
socially, or medically, with inconsistent or nonexistent record keeping
practices. 87 Frequently, the people born using donor sperm were
virtually without half of their medical histories and entirely without a
way to find them out.
Putting aside, for the moment, the issue of the offspring's right
to, or desire for, identifying information about their genitors, the lack
of non-identifying information (i.e. genetic and comprehensive
medical histories of the donors) has obvious, problematic implications
for the child.88 The current situation for children born from donated
genetic material is somewhat better than it used to be, though the
practices of clinics and doctors continue to be inconsistent.89
Furthermore, there exists a possible discrepancy between those who
have a donated ovum as part of their genetic repertoires, and those
who have been born using donated sperm.
85. See Haimes & Daniels, supra note 27, at 2.
86. See Kristin E. Koehler, Artificial Insemination: In the Child's Best Interest?, 5 ALB.
L.J. ScI. & TECH. 321, 334-35 (1996).
87. See id. See also Gibson, supra note 16, at 2-5.
88. See Koehler, supra note 86, at 330; Gibson, supra note 16, at 22.
89. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. In addition, inconsistency in record
keeping results from the practices adopted by different clinics in response to the demands
of their customers.
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This point speaks to one explanation of how record keeping has
changed and why. It is easy to conduct an assisted insemination with
little knowledge and no "technology" to speak of; on the other hand,
retrieval of ova, and the fertilization in vitro and implantation of an
embryo requires not only trained medical personnel, but also a high
degree of medical information from all involved parties. The woman
donating the ova and the woman preparing for implantation are both
subject to the plethora of potential side-effects from fertility drugs,
and are, therefore, much more likely to be monitored and have
extensive medical histories taken.90 The records, even if not readily
available, at least exist.
Another medical phenomenon, HIV, focussed new attention on
record keeping with respect to the provider of genetic material. The
AIDS crisis triggered testing of donor sperm, attention to the donor's
medical status, and a jolt of understanding as to the intimacy of third-
party gamete use. Indeed, the issue of AIDS caused the American
Fertility Society to reverse its previous position and to come out in
favor of record keeping and genetic testing.91 Still, inconsistency in
testing and record keeping remains among different clinics, as well as
between the use of donor sperm and ova.92 If all people born from
assisted conception are to have the same status, the information
collection should be consistent regardless of which of their gametes
were donated.93
B. Illustrative Distinctions Between Adoption and Assisted Conception
Historically and sociologically, the use of donor gametes (here,
we are generally talking about donor sperm because the technology
allowing the use of donor ova and embryos is, as mentioned above,
quite recent) 94 begs comparison to adoption.95 Like adoption, with
assisted conception the genetic or biological and the rearing
components of parenthood are separated. 96 Like adoption, the use of
90. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
91. See Eggen, supra note 26, at 672-73.
92. See Katz, supra note 14, at 736-38. See also UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF
ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 199 (Supp. 2000).
93. See §1(2), 9B U.L.A. at 202.
94. See Eggen, supra note 26, at 640.
95. See Andrews & Elster, supra note 82, at 125-27 (comparing adoption and
reproductive technology regarding the question of the collection and dissemination of
genetic information).
96. The exception to this is the widespread practice of second parent, or step-parent
adoptions, in which one of the offspring's biological parents is also a rearing parent and
that parent's partner adopts the child. It is noteworthy that the issue of second parent
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third-party genetic material97 was considered shameful and hidden
from the public or other family members.98 Consequently, the use of
donor sperm and ova has been governed by principles of secrecy and
closed records, as has adoption. Similar movements for open records
and fostering relationships between offspring and their genitors have
been brewing both in adoption and in assisted conception.99
Movements for change in these areas have come in the form of
legislation,1°° professional regulations,101 and private ordering.102
Scholars have looked to adoption statutes and case law to predict how
courts will treat claims by a child of assisted conception to
information about their genitor or genitors.
10 3
However, policy considerations at play in the disclosure of
identifying and non-identifying information may cut in opposite
directions when comparing adoption and the use of donated genetic
material, suggesting that different approaches should be taken and
that adoption laws not be controlling. There is reason and incentive
to address the issue of record keeping and access in the context of
donated gametes prospectively.
1. Commodification
Consumer preference-driven market forces are at play in both
adoption arises in the context of surrogacy: many surrogacy arrangements are, for
statistical purposes, recorded as second parent adoptions and thus go "unnoticed."
97. See Gibson, supra note 16, at 4-6.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 16, at 41-44 (proposing legislative measures that
would insure the rights of all persons born from donor insemination to identifying and
non-identifying information about their donor-genitor); Hans Greimel, Oregon Passes
Vote-By-Mail, Medical Marijuana, Adoption Measures, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
POLITICAL SERVICE, November 5, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7463373 (discussing the
passage of a ballot initiative in Oregon that would open all original birth certificates of
adoptees at the request of adult adoptees).
101. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
102. In the adoption context, the prevalence of "open" adoption arrangements has
increased. In an open adoption some continuing contact exists between the genitors
(biological parents) and the child. The degree and quality of contact is, generally,
controlled by the adoptive parents and by the contract. See Gibson, supra note 16, at 4-6.
Such private ordering exists in the world of donated gametes. The Sperm Bank of
California, for example, began an "ID Release" program which offered individuals or
couples seeking aid the option of donors who were willing to be contacted by the offspring
when the offspring reaches the age of 18. See Peggy Orenstein, Looking for a Donor to
Call Dad, NY TIMES, June 18, 1995, at 28 (providing a discussion of this program, as well
as a discussion of adults who were born from donor gametes).
103. See generally Andrews & Elster, supra note 82. See also Gibson, supra note 16,
passim.
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the adoption and assisted conception contexts. 1°4 It has been argued
that in the adoption context no collection of medical and genetic
information should occur, or, if collected, it should be withheld from
the adoptive parents until the adoption is finalized. Some fear that
children with certain genetic predispositions or medical histories will
be unadoptable.
Considering the Nation's focus on genetics to explain our
personalities and medical futures, this argument is quite persuasive.105
Especially so considering of the problem of the lack of adoptable
children-that is, children who are not being adopted in part because
of their medical or psychological conditions. °6  However, this
problem is not present with assisted conception in the same way.
Certainly individuals enlisting the help of third-party gametes may
similarly worry about genetic and behavioral components of their
potential children's personalities. Not surprisingly, many people
search for third party gametes provided by those with the most
desirable physical characteristics or highest intellectual aptitude.
There is, however, not a living child at stake and the "consumer's"
selectivity is, in that respect, harmless. 0 7 Therefore, the collection
and maintenance of genetic information and medical history of
gamete providers has no such potential deleterious effect upon the
offspring. This conclusion is buttressed by the requirements in some
states that genetic and/or medical history information be collected
about birth parents regardless of the aforementioned practical
considerations.
2. Incentive
An argument for keeping adoption records and gamete donors'
104. In the fertility industry the commodification of gametes and embryos is entirely
accepted, with the sole exception of Louisiana's prohibition on the sale of embryos. In the
adoption context the "sale" of babies is prohibited in every state, yet certain babies are
more valuable than others as reflected in their adoptability.
105. See Andrews & Elster, supra note 82, at 127-28 (discussing our society's emphasis
upon genetic explanations for behavioral tendencies and other personality components).
106. See Andrews & Elster, supra note 82, at 126-28 (discussing the reasoning of those
who have argued against the collection or dissemination of genetic or medical information
about potential adoptees).
107. Some, of course, are disturbed by a casual treatment of embryos by the medical
profession-either by using them for experimentation or by their destruction. However,
gametes and embryos (especially the "pre-embryos" available for donation and
implantation), do not have personhood status. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132-34
(1973). Therefore I distinguish between the gravity of children being unadopted from the
issue of embryos remaining unimplanted without, necessarily, needing to resolve the issue
as to whether the cryopreserved embryo is deserving of protection.
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identities under wraps is that without a guarantee of secrecy the
incentive to carry to term and give up for adoption, or to donate one's
ova or sperm, will diminish. The notion of incentive is certainly
stronger in assisted conception than it is in adoption.
Women who elect to surrender a child for adoption are likely to
be compelled by a belief in adoption (or against abortion), rather
than by an indifference to adoption or abortion, or by a desire to
protect their own anonymity.10 8 While some donors are willing to
forego their anonymity,10 9 there is generally less compulsion to donate
without the guarantee of anonymity, and less desire, on the part of
the donor, to have the possibility of contact remain open.110 This may
suggest that without the guarantee of anonymity the fertility industry
would be severely and adversely impacted. However, the notion of
genitor-offspring contact cannot be viewed in a bubble. As our
society evolves, and there is more social experience with the
relationship between donor and offspring (as contrasted with parent
and child) and as more families using assisted conception are
encouraged to discuss their children's origins with them, the
possibility of a known donor must be projected into a changed
society."' In evaluating the possible impact of lack of donor
anonymity it is essential to question what the feared result really is,
and whether it is a reasonable or even possible price to pay.
3. Social Palatability
The practical differences between adoption and assisted
108. This is not to suggest that a guarantee of anonymity has no impact upon the
decision.
109. This is the case with donors who are known to the parent or parents or in the case
of donors who provide their gametes through a clinic or sperm bank but indicate
contractually that they are willing to be contacted when the child reaches maturity. See
Gibson, supra note 16, at 6 (citing U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES:
SUMMARY OF A 1987 SURVEY 3 (1988) for the assertion that by 1987 nearly half of all
women using donor insemination used a known donor); see also Orenstein, supra note 102
(discussing the Sperm Bank of California's ID Release program and its supply of willing
donors).
110. Because the donation of gametes occurs before the existence of a live child there
may be less of a psychological connection to the offspring the gamete produces and
therefore less likelihood that the donor would wish to contact the offspring. While an
exception to this rule is the case of known donors who wish to establish parental rights,
donor registries are springing up which connect offspring to their genitors when both
parties are desirous of such contact.
111. By comparison, adoption practices have changed in the last 25 years and now
promote "open" adoptions to a much greater degree than in the past. See Gibson, supra
note 16, at 4-6.
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conception lead to conceptual differences in how our society views
the two. The adults who give up a baby for adoption are more likely
to be thought of as "connected" to the offspring-either because
society understands their desire to contact the offspring or accepts the
offspring's desire to contact his or her birth parents. Perhaps due to
newer social awareness and recent technological expansion of the use
of third-party genetic material, society is less comfortable with the
notion that there is a similar relationship between the donor and the
offspring as between an adoptee and their gamete providers."2 As a
result, there may be more sympathy toward an adoptee's efforts to
gain identifying information about his or her birth parents.
However, from the point of view of the offspring, the two
situations are fundamentally similar: the social parent is distinct from
the biological genitor. The needs or desires of the offspring with
adoption and assisted conception greatly overlap.
C. The Short Reaches of Other Areas of the Law
The precise issue of a record keeping duty in assisted conception
has not been brought before a court. However, tort claims against
sperm banks and fertility clinics on their duties of genetic testing of
third-party genetic material, or vis-a-vis the status and parentage of
the resulting child, have been decided narrowly." 3 It is therefore
doubtful that the current threat of tort claims would be enough
incentive to perform genetic testing and compile medical records, as
could be required by statute." 4 This is also true in the adoption
112. Frequently referred to as "biological parents."
113. See, e.g., Alexandria S. v. Pacific Fertility Med. Ctr., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23, 30 (Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that a child did have a claim against a fertility clinic for that clinic's
failure to secure the consent of the mother's husband to the insemination and, thus,
depriving the minor of a legal father); Harnicher v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d
67, 72 (Utah 1998) (failing to find any claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
against a fertility clinic based on that clinic's failure to use the chosen sperm donor in a
successful insemination).
114. Scholars have discussed various tort or contract-based methods of regulating the
use of assisted conception. However, these proposals generally address medical and
ethical standards of care, not the specific issue of record keeping for the use of the
offspring throughout his or her lifetime. See generally Heather J. Blum, Comment, Tort
Liability as the Result of the Transmission of HIV Through Artificial Insemination by
Donor, 4 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 333 (1994) (considering both tort and warranty theories
to impose legal duties to test donor sperm for HIV); Karen M. Ginsburg, Note, A Critique
of the Artificial Insemination Industry in the United States, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 823
(1997) (arguing for the adoption of a national sperm donor system regulated by the FDA
to avoid the inadequate donor screenings which have resulted in tort claims); Anita M.
Hodgson, Note, The Warranty of Sperm: A Modest Proposal to Increase the Accountability
of Sperm Banks and Physicians in the Performance of Artificial Insemination Procedures,
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context.1 1 5 Further, the tort remedy is insufficient: even if a court
were to find a tort duty to compile and maintain medical histories, no
remedy can produce the lost information.
In adoption cases, courts have repeatedly refused to recognize a
constitutional right to the opening of sealed adoption records that
would release the identity to the adoptee of his or her genitors.1 6 In
so doing, the courts have upheld the statutory or common law "good
cause" standard widely used to evaluate an adoptee's claim for
identifying or non-identifying information from their adoption
records or original birth certificate." 7 Although people born using
assisted conception may be able to utilize this "good cause" standard,
it has not been applied liberally, nor can it make up for an original
lack of record keeping.
Persons born from donated genetic material, like adoptees, have
conducted their own searches for their genitors." 8 There have been
articles written about their searches; groups and individuals maintain
websites." 9 Grass roots movements-working through lobbyists or
voter referenda-to mandate the maintenance and release of records
pertaining to the donors are already underway. The topic is not
purely academic: people exist who want this information.
IV. Uniform Status Of Children Of Assisted Conception Act:
The Appropriate Model For Nation-Wide Attention To The
Issue Of Record Keeping And Information Access
As presented above, a person born from third party gametes
retains special issues of status, particular to their experience of having
the genetic and rearing parenting roles separated. 20 The resulting
interests, needs, and rights of those children (and, perhaps more
appropriately, the adults they become) have been traditionally
26 IND. L. REv. 357 (1993) (evaluating and advocating the applicability of the Uniform
Commercial Code to the sale of donor sperm, noting the inadequacy of tort remedies);
Kathleen M. Peterson, Comment, Federal Regulation of Artificial Insemination Donor
Screening Practices: An Opportunity for Law to Co-evolve With Medicine, 96 DICK. L.
REV. 59 (1991). See also McIntyre, supra note 28 at 519.
115. See Andrews & Elster, supra note 82, at 133-35.
116. See id. at 139-47 (discussing the constitutional treatment of this issue and, more
broadly, the ways that courts and individuals have attempted to deal with such claims).
See also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
117. See id.
118. See Orenstein, supra note 102.
119. See id.
120. See supra Parts II.C, III.
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neglected.121 The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception
Act, though purporting to "address... the precise issue of the status
of children, their rights, security, and well being"'122 fails to recognize
this special issue of status literally embodied by children of assisted
conception.
Given that the status of children of assisted conception invokes a
need for mandatory record keeping of genitor medical information,
regulations protecting access to that information, and, perhaps,
protection of the offspring's right to the identity of his or her genitor,
the question becomes, how to protect and standardize these status
issues under the Act?
To begin with, the goal of the Drafting Committee must be kept
in mind: to "limit [the Act's] applicability to what is best for
children," and to "strengthen the focus of [the] Act in the eyes of
legislators and the public as prospective legislation which is needed
immediately to provide order, direction, and design with dignity to
the unsettled lives of our target children."'1 3 However, the Act's
objective with regards to the offspring must be developed in context;
as in most family law issues, competing rights and interests exist at
every juncture.
States, the traditional repository of family laws and policies,
certainly will want to retain their autonomy and independence in the
face of the myriad moral and policy-based issues presented by the
need for record keeping and information access regulations. These
competing rights, combined with the youthful quality of the offspring
(older offspring are frequently not aware of their status and come
from a time of no record keeping or disclosure) suggest, however,
that state legislatures will need encouragement and assistance in
regulating in the best interests of the child.
Then there are donors, some of whom have relied upon the
protection of anonymity in making a decision to give their sperm or
ova to others. Further, people who have used, are attempting to use,
or are contemplating the use of assisted conception no doubt have
concerns about the availability and variety of donated gametes and
embryos.
Clinics and physicians who work in the field of assisted
conception have concerns sympathetic to various parties. These
121. See supra Parts H.C, III.
122. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACr Prefatory Note, 9B
U.LA. 199 (Supp. 2000).
123. Id.
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practitioners have benefited from the market-driven development of
reproductive technology; their economic interest, and perhaps
philosophical beliefs, may favor little governmental involvement.
However, clear guidelines as to the duties of these professionals with
regards to their record keeping requirements may be comforting
when faced with strengthening movements of people who demand
information.
Ultimately, however, this issue is one of the offsprings' rights. In
keeping with the Act's broad policy statements, and its related desire
not to involve itself in the minutiae of regulation, the Commission
should amend the Act to put forth "certain basic principles" which
would create a duty to compile and maintain records of the donors'
medical histories and genetic traits.
To determine how these "certain basic principles" can be defined
and stated requires the cooperative efforts of legal, medical, and
perhaps psychological and sociological minds. A research body,
comprised of these same legal, medical, and psychological or
sociological experts needs to convene to determine at a base line level
what pieces of medical information are of need to a person born of
assisted conception as they go through life; this need must be assessed
from a medical as well as psychological point of view. Essentially, the
Act should contain a provision stating that every child of assisted
conception has a right to easily attainable medical history about the
donor, as determined by this research body.
While there are many areas in which this medical compendium
may be specific, such as certain medical conditions of which we know
now there is a genetic causal component, it must also consider the
development of future medical research and allow for change through
broad language or provisions which mandate the reconvention of a
committee to update the requirements.
The Drafting Committee's decision not to require that donated
gametes be provided through a licensed physician poses a logistical
challenge with regards to obtaining and maintaining records about
the providers. Individuals who are using known donors without going
through a clinic or medical professional may not be aware of these
proposed requirements of the Act or may not be comfortable
demanding such medical information. (Again, only the use of donor
sperm is really at issue here.) Therefore, the added record keeping
requirement of the Act should include a special provision which
accounts for this possibility: in the absence of such records when the
third party genetic material is not provided through a licensed
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physician, the Act should grant the offspring with identifying
information about the provider. In the case of an offspring who is
under the age of eighteen (when parentage determinations may have
attendant support obligations) this information may be provided to
the court and the donor shall remain anonymous to the child if that
donor wishes.
The issue of a person's right to identifying information about his
or her genitors presents the challenge of accommodating a greater
number of concerns identified above: the position of many that this
information is of right; the fear that there will be significantly fewer
donors without a protection of anonymity (and the corollary
argument as to whose rights are most important-the offspring's right
to identifying information, the parent's right to get donated genetic
material, the donor's right to donate with anonymity); the disparate
treatment of persons born from assisted conception and adoptees;
and the rights of states to differ in policy decisions from one another.
While it is my opinion that the right to identifying information
should be absolute when the offspring reaches the age of majority,
there is clearly no consensus on-or current constitutional
justification for-that position. Therefore, I recommend that there
be added to the Act two alternative provisions treating the release of
identifying information, such as was done with surrogacy. Alternative
A should provide for an absolute right to identifying information
about the donor-possibly name, social security number, drivers
license number, and last known address; Alternative B should codify
the "good-cause" standard employed by many states, and allow the
offspring access to this identifying information upon demonstrating
that some good cause exists, such as the destruction of the mandated
records or a newly discovered medical condition in which either party
could benefit greatly from information from the other.
States may establish programs, through the courts or through
administrative agencies, which facilitate the record keeping and
information exchanges that these amendments to the Act require. A
state-managed warehouse for medical records would alleviate the
burden imposed upon practitioners by the requirement that these
records be kept and maintained. Clearly, if such a storage procedure
became publicly administered privacy concerns would be paramount.
However, the interests of the offspring and their families would be
protected to the extent that their rights to information would not be
compromised by the closing of a clinic or medical practice.
Further, donor registries, or other judicially or administratively
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run services which attempt to pair information-seeking offspring with
donors willing to be contacted (or vice versa) offer a means to assist
parties in knowing one another's identities without absolutely
requiring such. These non-statutory actions by the states can be
outlined and suggested in comments to the amendments to the Act.
V. Conclusion
The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act was
a well-intended attempt at meeting what is still a dire need: laws to
benefit and protect people born from assisted conception. Whether
bedazzled by technology, or swayed by the media attention to
surrogacy, the Act failed to address the age-old and persisting need,
felt by those same people, for information.
Perhaps such an omission was produced by the notion that the
methods by which assisted conception is performed are not crucial to
the status of the person who results. 24 If that was the Drafting
Committee's reasoning, it was misguided. Only with a requirement
that certain medical information-at the very least-be gathered and
maintained, and only with a treatment of the offspring's "right to
know" will there be "order, direction, and design with dignity to the
unsettled lives of our target children."'2
124. See § 1 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 202 (explaining that the Act was "not intended to
establish a regulatory scheme establishing the appropriate methods for the performance of
such assisted conception. A jurisdiction may, e.g., choose to enact separate regulations
requiring genetic screening when assisted conception is undertaken, requiring that assisted
conception be conducted only under certain conditions, etc.").
125. Id. Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. at 199.
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